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Thailand is mainland South-East Asia’s largest energy consumer. Since the early 1990s, community 
and civil society opposition to new domestic large-scale power projects has strengthened within 
Thailand. Partly in response and facilitated by deepening regional economic integration, Thailand’s 
electricity utility, private sector energy, and construction companies have increasingly looked to-
wards neighbouring Laos and Myanmar to supply Thailand’s energy markets. This paper assesses 
the political economy of Thailand’s power sector development through the lens of distributive and 
procedural environmental justice, including the role of social movements and civil society in Thailand 
in reforming the country’s power planning process. The environmental and social costs of domestic 
power projects and power import projects are discussed. The author concludes that Thailand’s exist-
ing energy imports from hydropower projects in Laos and a gas project in Myanmar have exported 
environmental injustice associated with energy production across borders, exploiting the compara-
tively weak rule of law, judicial systems, and civil and political freedoms in these neighbouring coun-
tries. 
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Thailand ist der größte Energieverbraucher in Festland-Südostasien. Seit den frühen 1990-er Jahren 
hat sich der zivilgesellschaftliche Widerstand gegen neue großfl  ächige Energieprojekte in Thailand 
verstärkt. Teilweise als Antwort darauf und erleichtert durch sich vertiefende regionale Integration 
haben thailändische Stromversorgungsunternehmen sowie private Energie- und Bauunternehmen 
zunehmend in die Nachbarländer Laos und Myanmar geblickt, die den Energiebedarf Thailands 
decken sollen. Dieser Artikel beurteilt die politische Ökonomie der Entwicklung des thailändischen 
Energiesektors durch die Brille distributiver und prozeduraler Umweltgerechtigkeit sowie die Rolle 
von sozialen Bewegungen und Zivilgesellschaft in den Reformprozessen der Energieplanung. Des Wei-
teren werden Umwelt- und soziale Kosten von Binnen- und Importenergieprojekten diskutiert. Der 
Autor argumentiert, dass Thailands Energieimporte von Wasserkraftprojekten in Laos und einem 
Gasprojekt in Myanmar ökologische Ungerechtigkeit in Bezug auf Energieproduktion exportieren 
und die vergleichsweise schwachen Systeme von Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Justiz sowie Zivilgesellschaft 
und politischer Freiheit in den beiden Nachbarländern ausnutzen.
1   Carl Middleton is a lecturer at the International Development Studies programme at the Faculty of Political Science, 
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. His research interests include environmental politics and policies in South-East 
Asia, with a particular focus on the political ecology of water and energy resources. The author would like to thank 
two anonymous reviewers, Oliver Pye, and Melanie Pichler for their constructive comments on the paper. The paper 
was prepared with partial support from the International Cooperation and Human Security project (HS1069A) of Chula 
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Introduction
Since the 1960s, Thailand has undergone a profound transformation from a predom-
inantly agrarian towards an export-orientated industrial society. This transforma-
tion has been paralleled by a massive increase in electricity demand. Thailand’s total 
electricity system capacity has grown eleven-fold from 2,838 megawatts in 1982 to 
32,395 megawatts as of 2011 (Energy Policy and Planning Office [EPPO], 2012; Greacen 
& Greacen, 2004). Within Thailand, whilst measures of human development have 
improved for most, economic inequality has widened and there is a growing political 
polarisation (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2009, p. 52-61, 78). 
The construction of large power stations developed with limited public participation 
and a failure to fully address or compensate for environmental and social harms are 
part of the legacy of contested injustices carried forward to the present day.
Since the late 1980s, Thai community movements and civil society groups have 
increasingly resisted new large power plants in Thailand, with high-profile protests 
against projects such as the Pak Mun hydropower dam and the Mae Moh coal-fired 
power station. Over the same period, Thailand’s power sector has shifted from a 
state-led to a partially-liberalised model (Wattana, Sharma, & Vaiyavuth, 2008), 
whilst a process of regional economic integration has deepened Thailand’s economic 
ties with neighbouring countries. This has enabled Thailand’s power planners to look 
towards Laos and Myanmar for power imports from Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs), where there are relatively abundant water resources that could be harnessed 
for hydro-electricity, major gas reserves in the case of Myanmar, and where commu-
nity and civil society opposition is constrained (Simpson, 2007). 
Through the lens of environmental justice, this paper examines the evolution of 
Thailand’s power sector and the consequences for affected communities’ natural 
resources, health, and livelihoods in Thailand and neighbouring countries. It argues 
that whilst many power projects continue to be built and contested in Thailand it-
self, the projects in neighbouring countries have weaker standards in terms of public 
participation, environmental protection, and mitigation or compensation for social 
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impacts than those in present-day Thailand and therefore constitute an exportation 
of environmental injustice across borders. 
The paper first defines environmental injustice. It then reviews the political econ-
omy of Thailand’s power sector since the 1950s and assesses two contested large 
power projects in Thailand from the perspective of environmental justice. The paper 
then turns to power sector planning and reform in Thailand, the implications of re-
gional economic integration and regional power trade, and the role played by Thai 
private sector energy and construction companies and commercial banks. Three re-
gional energy trade projects, namely the Theun Hinboun and Xayaburi hydropower 
projects in Laos and the Yadana gas project in Myanmar are then discussed from a 
transborder environmental justice perspective.
What is Environmental (In)justice?
The concept of environmental injustice first emerged in the United States (US) in the 
late 1970s to name and explain institutionalised discrimination along lines of race and 
class in the siting of toxic waste facilities and other polluting projects (Bullard, 1990). 
Now infamous cases, for example the Love Canal in New York State, and broader 
research revealed that industrial facilities damaging the environment and people’s 
health were systematically being located in low-income predominantly African-Ame-
rican or Hispanic neighbourhoods. These projects, furthermore, were often promo-
ted as affirmative actions to bring employment to previously marginalised communi-
ties, and thereby to redress past social injustice. In fact, the project developers were 
seeking a ‘path of least resistance’ after opposition by wealthier and more politically 
represented neighbourhoods against “Locally Unwanted Land Uses” (LULUs), now 
well-known as the “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) phenomena (Bullard, 1990, p. 4). 
In parallel, as the process of globalisation has accelerated since the 1970s and 
Northern countries have de-industrialised, many polluting and hazardous industrial 
facilities have been relocated to Southern countries, and the North has exported its 
toxic wastes for disposal to the South (McMichael, 2004). Many of these polluting in-
dustries are nowadays prohibited in Northern countries and thereby take advantage 
of weaker environmental governance in Southern countries. Analogous to the US, ASEAS 5(2)
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projects relocated to the South have often been claimed to bring ‘development’. As a 
result, many cases of transborder environmental injustice have emerged (Schroeder, 
St. Martin, Wilson, & Sen, 2008).
The concept of environmental justice incorporates principles of distributive and 
procedural justice, including adherence to the rule of law, equal treatment for mi-
nority groups, and respect for human rights including the right to protection from 
environmental degradation. Distributive justice calls for the fair distribution of en-
vironmental harms, benefits, and risks (Pedersen, 2010). Procedural justice seeks to 
instil justice into institutional decision-making processes that may otherwise appor-
tion environmental harms, benefits, and risks inequitably and addresses procedur-
al issues such as public participation, access to information, transparency, and ac-
countability. Procedural justice may be granted through the courts, through formal 
planning processes, within parallel social forums, or through direct political action 
(Schroeder et al., 2008). 
Political Economy of Thailand’s Electricity Sector 
Before the 1960s, Thailand’s electrification rate was very low. However, from the 
1950s, as the Cold War escalated and the US sought Thailand as an ally, USAID and 
the World Bank supported the development of several large power generation pro-
jects, the early stages of Thailand’s electricity transmission network, and the estab-
lishment of the state-owned electricity utilities, including the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) in 1968 (Wattana et al., 2008). This support has shaped 
the centralised power generation and high-voltage transmission system that exists 
in Thailand today (Chaivongvilan, Sharma, & Suwin, 2008). EGAT emerged as an influ-
ential political actor, given the relationship between Thailand’s industrialisation and 
the demand for electricity to fuel this economic growth (Greacen & Greacen, 2004).
Up until 1992, EGAT was Thailand’s monopoly generator of electricity and was in-
centivised to maintain its monopoly and to expand its capacity due to a ‘cost-plus’ 
pricing policy, which is a ‘rate-of-return’ model that allocated returns to EGAT accord-
ing to the total investment made. Whilst this arrangement achieved rapid electricity 
industry expansion during the 1980s and 1990s, it also resulted in the downplaying of ASEAS 5(2)
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environmental and social costs, and as over-investment began to occur since the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, it also passed these costs on to electricity consumers (Greacen & 
Greacen, 2004).
EGAT’s growing debts and a series of pro-business governments in Thailand from 
the early 1980s increased pressure for a privatisation of the Thai energy sector. 
In 1992, Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun amended the EGAT Act allowing the 
state enterprise to issue long-term concessions to private sector IPPs under take-or-
pay contract arrangements. EGAT established a subsidiary, the Electricity Generating 
Company (EGCO), to operate two of its most profitable plants as IPPs, whilst main-
taining a 45 percent share in the company, and began negotiating contracts with 
other IPPs (Greacen & Greacen, 2004).
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, declining electricity demand together with 
EGAT’s commitments to long-term take-or-pay contracts left it severely indebted. 
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, promoting neoliberal economic 
policies as conditionality to their recovery packages, sought to further liberalise 
Thailand’s power sector and to create a power-pool electricity market. Whilst the 
plan for a power pool model was eventually shelved due to EGAT’s own resistance 
(Wattana et al., 2008), the state enterprise was forced to sell assets, including its 
Ratchaburi power plant as an IPP, which it maintained a 45 percent share in. Fur-
thermore, EGAT was required to allow private companies more access to the energy 
sector (Greacen & Greacen, 2004). These initial waves of partial liberalisation were 
conducted in the absence of an effective electricity regulator (Chaivongvilan et al., 
2008). 
Having first established a Ministry of Energy in 2002, Prime Minister Thaksin Shi-
nawatra’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) government sought to reform Thailand’s power sector. 
Thaksin planned to corporatise EGAT as a public company at the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) that reflected TRT’s policy to expand SET and project Thailand’s eco-
nomic influence into neighbouring countries. However, the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Thailand blocked the SET listing in 2006, following opposition by a civil so-
ciety coalition that included consumer associations, energy policy think tanks, and 
EGAT’s union that were concerned about the absence of an energy regulator. Subse-
quently, the Energy Industry Act, B.E. 2550 (2007) established the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) (Wattana et al., 2008).ASEAS 5(2)
297 296
Carl Middleton - Transborder Environmental Justice in Regional Energy Trade in Mainland South-East Asia
As of 2012, Thailand’s peak power demand was 26,121 megawatts, whilst Thai-
land’s total generating capacity was 32,395 megawatts (EPPO, 2012). Thailand’s most 
recent Power Development Plan (PDP) estimates that electricity demand will almost 
triple to 70,686 megawatts by 2030 (EPPO, 2012). EGAT and private sector producers 
each generate approximately half of Thailand’s electricity.
Narratives of Environmental Injustice Towards Domestic Power Projects
From the late 1980s, the dominance of EGAT and perceived lack of accountability in 
the planning and operation of large-scale power plants caused growing grievance 
amongst rural communities who experienced the social and environmental conse-
quences. The Pak Mun hydropower dam and the Mae Moh lignite-fired power station 
are two projects that have seen long periods of contestation and hold symbolic sig-
nificance in the restructuring of society-state relations and reform of electricity and 
environmental governance. These cases, summarised below, are representative of a 
number of other protests against power projects in Thailand.
The Pak Mun Dam
The Pak Mun dam, located on the Mun River in Ubon Ratchathani province, Northeast 
Thailand, is a long contested dam project between the project’s proponents including 
EGAT, the Thai state, and the World Bank, and locally affected communities and sup-
portive civil society groups (Foran & Manorom, 2009; Missingham, 2003). The project 
is a 136 megawatts run-of-the-river project that was completed in 1994. A case study 
completed by the World Commission on Dams found that 1,700 households were relo-
cated, at least 6,200 households suffered a loss of livelihoods, there was a loss of 116 
fish species in the river (44 percent of the pre-dam fish biodiversity), and fishery yields 
upstream of the dam project dropped by up to 80 percent (Amornsakchai et al., 2000).
Through a succession of Thai governments, protestors against the project first 
sought for compensation and subsequently for the dam to be decommissioned. Op-
position to the project was expressed through the occupation of the dam site, a 
protest camp from 1999 to 2002 next to the dam site, prolonged rallies in Bangkok ASEAS 5(2)
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and encampments outside government houses, and villager-led Thai Baan research.2 
The social movement’s challenges to EGAT and the state agencies resulted in notable 
concessions, including the opening of the dam’s gates between 2001 and 2002 and the 
Thai government’s order to keep the gates open for four months of the year. At the 
same time, the state acted repressively, and there were numerous violent confronta-
tions (Foran & Manorom, 2009). 
In opposing the project, local community movements and NGOs created an injus-
tice narrative in a distributive sense regarding the basic rights of Thai citizens as well 
as in the procedural sense, for example, the entitlement to information and public 
participation in project planning (Foran & Manorom, 2009). Complex arrays of actors 
interacted through formal and informal processes such as the Thai Baan research and 
extraordinary politics such as street protests, seeking justice. The politically negoti-
ated opening of the dam gates was an important first in Thailand. Whilst the situa-
tion is yet to be finally settled, Pak Mun was the last major hydropower dam built in 
Thailand and has required the dam building industry to look towards neighbouring 
countries.
Mae Moh Power Plant
The 2,625 megawatts Mae Moh lignite-fired power plant is operated by EGAT and 
located in Lampang province, Northern Thailand. The lignite fuel is sourced from a 
135 square kilometres open pit mine nearby which produces 40,000 tons per day. The 
coal dust from the mine and the emission of sulphur dioxide and toxic chemicals, 
such as mercury and arsenic, from burning the lignite at the Mae Moh power plant 
have polluted local water sources, contaminated rice fields, and resulted in serious 
health problems for local communities. Greenpeace (2005) reports that 30,000 people 
have been displaced from their homes, more than 200 people died due to exposure to 
pollutants from the mine and power plant, and over 600 villagers have suffered acute 
respiratory problems. 
To address the problems of the lignite mine and power plant, local communi-
ties formed the Network of Occupational Health Sufferers of Thailand. A lawsuit was 
2   Thai Baan is a community-based research methodology in which villagers are the principal researchers. It was 
developed in response to the scientific research methods used by development experts that can misunderstand or 
ignore the relationship between local livelihoods, culture, and river-based ecosystems (see www.livingriversiam.org/
work/tb_research_en.htm). ASEAS 5(2)
299 298
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launched in 1998 by villagers in Mae Moh district seeking redress for their respiratory 
problems. Three subsequent lawsuits were filed claiming damage for health deterio-
ration, physical and mental grievances, compensation for medical expenses, and for 
damage to crops and land (Greenpeace, 2005). In May 2004, the Thai provincial court 
awarded THB 5.7 million to villagers for crop damage caused by the power plant. 
Subsequently, in March 2009, in response to 35 lawsuits filed by residents in 2004, 
the court required EGAT to compensate 130 villagers who had suffered severe health 
problems (Boonlong, Farbotko, Parfondry, Graham, & Macer, 2011). 
The Mae Moh communities’ use of the rule of law and court system to seek 
redress has contributed towards strengthening the procedural accountability 
of power plant planning and operation. Numerous other coal-fired power sta-
tions have been contested by local communities. Some have been cancelled, for 
example Bo Nok and the Hin Grud power stations in Prachuab Kirikhan prov-
ince in the late 1990s (Greenpeace, 2002). However, other projects such as the 
gas-fired Kang Koi 2 power plant in Saraburi province were built in their place.
Power Sector Planning and Reform in Thailand
Whilst initially affected communities and civil society groups protested individual 
power projects that epitomised distributive environmental injustices, they were also 
seeking to influence EGAT’s power planning process itself and the respective pro-
cedural injustices. Narrative frames of dam-proponents, for example, stating “the 
dam has already been built so why not use it” had challenged project opponents, 
revealing the need to participate earlier in the power planning process (Foran & 
Manorom, 2009). Through official processes and committees, the media, and extra-
policy processes and actions, civil society groups such as Palang Thai, Greenpeace, 
Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), Alternative Energy Project 
for Sustainability (AEPS), the Healthy Public Policy Foundation (HPPF), and numerous 
project-affected community movements have critically questioned Thailand’s PDP 
and its decision-making process and criteria.
Thailand’s PDP is drafted by EGAT, before being reviewed by the Energy Policy Plan-
ning Office (EPPO) in the Ministry of Energy. The PDP is then submitted to the National 
Energy Planning Council (NEPC) chaired by the Prime Minister for approval, before ASEAS 5(2)
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being submitted for final approval by Thailand’s cabinet. Civil society groups have 
argued that EGAT in the PDP heavily promotes the development of large-scale elec-
tricity generation plants that generate profit for the state-owned electricity utilities, 
energy companies, and the construction industry, whilst downplaying the potential 
for energy efficiency and renewable energy (Greacen & Footner, 2006). Civil society 
studies have also revealed systematic overestimates of electricity demand forecasts 
resulting in overinvestment in generation capacity (Greacen & Footner, 2006; Grea-
cen & Greacen, 2012), whilst EGAT has argued that overinvestment is less costly to 
Thailand’s economy than underinvestment (Thabchumpon and Middleton, in press). 
In 2004, civil society groups in Thailand prepared an alternative PDP (Permpong-
sacharoen, 2004). Since then, two expanded studies have been developed by Green-
peace and Palang Thai (Greacen & Greacen, 2012; Greacen & Footner, 2006). Using 
officially available data of the Thai government, these studies have sought to demon-
strate how Thailand could meet its energy needs through repowering existing power 
stations, and promoting energy efficiency and demand side management as well as 
renewable energy technologies. In doing so, they sought to incorporate additional 
environmental and societal objectives into decision-making, make the power plan-
ning process more transparent and participatory, and pushed for more ambitious 
targets and regulatory reform for decentralised and renewable power generation. 
Thailand’s power sector has seen important reform over the past decade, includ-
ing new renewable energy regulations, promotion of Combined Heat and Power 
Plants, and the creation of an Energy Regulatory Commission in 2007 (Greacen & 
Footner, 2006; Wisuttisak, 2012). In 2002, Thailand was the first developing country to 
adopt net metering regulations for very small power producers generating beneath 
one megawatt (Greacen & Footner, 2006). Furthermore, since 2007 a slight but im-
perfect increase in transparency and public participation has emerged with public 
hearings now held during the PDP preparation process, together with a commitment 
to increase the use of renewable energy (Foran, Wong, & Kelley, 2010). Despite these 
incremental steps, weak transparency and accountability in decision-making that 
privilege large industry interests remain entrenched in Thailand’s power planning 
(Thongplon, 2008). 
More widely, there have also been legislative developments that support environ-
mental justice in Thailand (Nicro, Friend, & Pradubsuk, 2011). Thailand’s 1997 People’s ASEAS 5(2)
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Constitution created a greater commitment to civil liberties and political space, in-
cluding the creation of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (Phongpai-
chit & Baker, 2002). The most recent 2007 Constitution contains several important 
provisions, including Article 56 on the right to access public information, Article 57 
on the state’s responsibility to hold public hearings on projects that could affect the 
quality of the environment, and Article 67 on the need for environmental impact 
assessment and health impact assessments. Unger and Siroros (2011) argue, how-
ever, that important institutional weaknesses remain in Thailand’s political system 
that limit implementation of environment-related policies and conflict resolution 
amongst diverse interest groups, including weak linkages between political parties 
and groups in society and few alternative representation institutions.
Regional Economic Integration and Power Trade
Given that EGAT predicts a large growth in power demand in Thailand and faces strong 
community and civil society resistance to new large power projects domestically, pow-
er imports are an important strategy to ensure Thailand’s energy security. Furthermore, 
Thailand is heavily dependent on natural gas and EGAT is keen to diversify its fuel sour-
ces with hydropower and coal-fired power stations in Myanmar and Laos. In response, 
the governments of Myanmar and Laos are keen to develop their relatively unexploited 
power generation potential for export and domestic demand (Kaisti & Käkönen, 2012). 
Regional power trade has been promoted and facilitated by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank’s (ADB) Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme since the early 
1990s (Greacen & Palettu, 2007; Hirsch, 2010). The ADB’s first regional electricity 
study envisaged a network of high-voltage transmission lines opening up mountain-
ous regions mostly in Laos, Yunnan province of China, and Myanmar to hydropower 
development to export electricity to Thailand and Vietnam (Norconsult, 1994). In 
2002, a second study filled out the details of this plan, and in 2009, the plan’s logic 
was extended to the wider energy sector, including coal and gas (ADB, 2009). These 
studies claim that by facilitating access to new and cheaper generation sources and 
creating a competitive regional power trade market investment requirements and 
electricity costs can be reduced.ASEAS 5(2)
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ADB’s early proposals for regional power trade were criticised by civil society for 
not taking account of cumulative social and environmental impacts, and for having 
been prepared without the participation of diverse stakeholders (International Rivers 
Network, 2004). Other studies questioned the economic viability and benefits of the 
plan, finding the predicted costs of hydropower unrealistically cheap, and highlight-
ing significant risks in regulating and coordinating the transmission of electricity 
regionally, given the political circumstances and level of technical capacity and in-
vestment in the region (Garrett, 2004; Ryder, 2004; Yu, 2003).
To expand regional energy trade, Thailand has signed Memoranda of Understand-
ing of 7,000 megawatts and 1,500 megawatts with the governments of Laos and 
Myanmar respectively. At present, Thailand imports approximately 2,000 megawatts 
from nine hydropower dams in Laos, with major projects including the Nam Theun 
2 (1075 megawatts), Thuen Hinboun (220 megawatts), and Nam Ngum 2 (615 mega-
watts) dams (EGAT, 2010; Government of Laos, 2012). Table 1 summarises plans for 
future power imports.
 
Table 1: Power imports from laos and Myanmar to Thailand According to PDP 2010 (Revision 3)
* Not including projects decommissioned     ** Located in Laos   *** Including some possibly located in Myanmar
PRoJEcT
Theun Hinboun Expansion **
-
Hongsa **
Hongsa **
-
Nam Ngiep 1 **
Xe Pian **
Xayaburi **
Unspecified projects ***
PRoJEcT SizE
220 MW
-
982 MW
491 MW
-
269 MW
390 MW
1220 MW
300 MW per year 
from unspecified 
projects
AnnuAl cAPAciTy incREASE
ToTAl *
1871 MW
6329 MW
4791 MW
3121 MW
2205 MW
1770 MW
3241 MW
FRoM PowER iMPoRTS
12%
0%
20%
16%
0%
37%
37%
yEAR
2012
2013-2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2021-2030
Source: Author‘s own compilation based on EPPO, 2012ASEAS 5(2)
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Regional Expansion of Thai Energy and Construction Companies and Banks
Alongside companies from Vietnam and China, Thailand’s energy and construction 
companies and commercial banks have figured prominently in building hydropower 
dams in Laos to date (Table 2) (Government of Laos, 2012; Middleton, Garcia, & Foran, 
2009). As Glassman (2010) highlights, these companies are seeking profitable invest-
ment opportunities in neighbouring countries under the liberalising investment re-
gime of the GMS. To date, each major power export project in Laos to Thailand has 
at least one Thai developer involved, suggesting that these projects build on existing 
business networks and knowledge of Thailand’s power sector. 
In the past, when major power projects were commissioned by the state, Thai con-
struction companies would compete to secure construction contracts. At present, 
within the increasingly liberalised power sector, the role of construction companies 
has changed and they have become active proponents of the projects themselves as 
constructors and operators. The Ital-Thai Development Corporation (ITD), for example, 
was originally a 15 percent shareholder in Nam Theun 2 that started commercial 
operation in March 2010. However, having secured and fulfilled its role as principle 
civil works contractor (Lawrence, 2009), ITD fully divested its shares in October 2010 
(PRLog, 2010). Some Thai project developers, including ITD, are publically listed com-
panies on SET and therefore are incentivised by shareholder expectations. For exam-
ple, following the government of Lao’s announcement in November 2012 that there 
would be a ground-breaking ceremony for the proposed USD 3.5 billion Xayaburi dam 
on the Mekong River’s mainstream, the share price of Ch.Karnchang – the lead project 
developer and Thailand’s second largest construction company – rose 5.7 percent to 
its highest level since January 2011 (Chemaphun, 2012).
Whilst EGAT’s contribution to total generation capacity in Thailand under the par-
tially liberalised industry structure is capped at approximately 50 percent, EGAT is 
able to increase its share of total generation capacity via IPPs, deepening its mono 
poly role (Wisuttisak, 2012). As Table 2 indicates, EGAT is a shareholder in two thirds 
of the power-import projects through its share ownership in EGCO (25 percent), 
Ratchaburi (45 percent), and EGAT International (100 percent).ASEAS 5(2)
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Table 2: Thai Developers and Financiers of Major Power Projects in laos
* Partners in consortiums     ** COD = Commission Operation Date 
*** International Financing Review Asia, 2 February 2008
PRoJEcT
Houay Ho 
(152 MW;  
Commissioned 1999)
Theun Hinboun
(220 MW;  
Commissioned 1998)
Nam Theun 2
(1075 MW;  
Commissioned 2010)
Nam Ngum 2
(615 MW;  
COD** 2012)
Theun Hinboun  
Expansion Project
(220+60 MW;  
COD** 2012)
Hongsa Lignite 
(1878 MW;  
COD** 2015)
Nam Ngiep 1 
(262 MW;  
COD** 2018)
Xepian-Xenamnoy 
(390 MW;  
COD** 2018)
Xayaburi Dam 
(1285 MW;  
COD** 2019)
ThAi DEVEloPERS*
HHTC (20%)
GMS Power (20%)
Electricity Generating Company  
of Thailand (EGCO) (35%)
Ch. Karnchang (28.5%),  
Ratchaburi (25%),  
Bangkok Expressway (12.5%),  
TEAM Consulting Engineering (1%)
MDX (20%)
Ratchaburi (40%),  
Banpu (40%)
EGAT International (30%)
Ratchaburi (25%)
Ch. Karnchang (50%),  
PTT plc (25%), 
EGCO (12.5%),  
BKK Expressway (7.5%),  
PT Construction and Irrigation (5%)
ThAi FinAnciERS*
Unknown
Refinancing in 2002 by  
unidentified Thai banks***
Bangkok Bank, Bank of Ayudhya,  
Kasikorn Bank, Krung Thai Bank,  
Siam City Bank, Siam Commercial  
Bank, Thai Military Bank
Krung Thai Bank, Siam City Bank,  
Thai Military Bank
Bank of Ayudhya, Kasikorn Bank,  
Siam City Bank, Thanachart Bank
Siam Commercial Bank, Bangkok 
Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Government 
Saving Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Bank of 
Ayudhya, Siam City Bank, Thai Mili-
tary Bank
Kasikorn Bank, and unknown others 
(and ADB)
Unknown
Kasikorn Bank, Bangkok Bank, Siam 
Commercial Bank, Krung Thai Bank
Source: Based on Middleton (2009) and www.poweringprogress.orgASEAS 5(2)
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Transborder Environmental (In)justice 
Within South-East Asia, environmental governance is uneven (Middleton, 2012). In 
principle, power projects in Laos and Myanmar could stimulate economic growth 
through investment and its secondary effects, encourage job creation, and generate 
revenues for the governments to reinvest into development. However, in both coun-
tries media freedom is limited, independent civil society organisations are restricted, 
open community protests are repressed, incomplete or inconsistent laws are often 
unimplemented, there is weak rule of law, and corruption is a serious challenge (The 
Burma Environmental Working Group [BEWG], 2011; Stuart-Fox, 2006). 
Numerous projects that supply electricity or gas from neighbouring countries to 
Thailand have been documented as impacting local people and the environment in-
cluding Nam Theun 2 (Lawrence, 2009; Singh, 2009; Trandem, 2012), Nam Ngum 2 
(International Rivers, 2008), Houay Ho (Delang & Toro, 2011; International Rivers, 
2008), and Theun Hinboun (see below) in Laos, and gas exports (see below) and the 
proposed Salween dams (BEWG, 2011; Magee & Kelley, 2009) in Myanmar. 
The following sections outline the political context in Laos and Myanmar as rel-
evant to energy project development and two examples of regional energy trade pro-
jects as notable examples of transborder distributional environmental injustice. The 
paper then turns to a discussion on procedural justice for transborder power projects 
within Thailand’s power planning process.
Laos and the Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Dam
Laos is predominantly an agrarian society. With the introduction of the New Eco-
nomic Mechanism policy in 1986 that led the country’s single-party communist gov-
ernment towards a market economy, export-orientated agribusiness, hydropower, 
and mining investment has accelerated. The economic growth was accompanied by a 
range of environmental and social costs (Lintner, 2008; Middleton et al., 2009; Ruther-
ford, Lazarus, & Kelley, 2008). A reasonably comprehensive – although fragmented 
– legal and policy framework for power project development exists, prepared with 
support from the ADB and World Bank amongst others, including measures for com-
munity participation, project information disclosure, environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA) preparation, and compensation and resettlement with livelihood restora-ASEAS 5(2)
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tion for affected communities (Suhardiman, Silva, & Carew-Reid, 2012). Furthermore, 
the “National Policy for Environmental and Social Sustainability of the Hydropower 
Sector in Lao PDR” (2005) emphasises economic, social, and ecological dimensions 
of sustainability. In practice, however, despite some improvement, enforcement is 
weak. For example, EIA and Resettlement Action Plans have generally not been dis-
closed to the public and are often of questionable quality (Baird & Shoemaker, 2007; 
International Rivers, 2008). Furthermore, project site selection and operation is pre-
dominantly driven by the priorities of private sector investors rather than integrated 
water-, land-, and energy planning by the government (Suhardiman et al., 2012). 
The 210 megawatts Theun-Hinboun hydropower project, commissioned in 1998, was 
Laos’ first build–operate–transfer (BOT) hydropower project jointly-owned through the 
Theun Hinboun Power Company (THPC) by Electricité du Laos (60 percent), Norway’s 
Statkraft (20 percent) and Thailand’s GMS Power (20 percent). The project exports 95 
percent of its power to Thailand and was partially funded by the ADB and the Nordic 
Development Fund. The environmental and social performance of the project has been 
heavily contested between THPC and environmental NGOs (Whitington, 2012). At first, 
the project was announced to be a success by the ADB (Gill, 1997), but subsequent 
independent research revealed serious impact on between 25,000 and 30,000 people 
living along three rivers, including markedly reduced fishery catches, loss of vegetable 
gardens, fishing nets and other assets, riverbank erosion, and downstream flooding 
resulting in loss of wet season rice crops (Association for International Water Studies, 
2007; Shoemaker, 1998). In response, the THPC established an Environment Management 
Division with a USD 10 million, 10 year budget and initiated a Mitigation and Compensa-
tion Program in September 2000 (Whitington, 2012). Whilst the programme was able to 
address some of the material needs of the villagers (e.g. building wells), it has struggled 
to ensure the long-term recovery of livelihoods, for example, through the production 
of dry season rice, cash crops, and livestock (Association for International Water Stud-
ies, 2007; Barney, 2007). In October 2008, the THPC commenced construction of an 
expansion dam project, despite having not fully resolved and compensated for existing 
social and environmental problems caused by the original project. For this reason, and 
because the expansion project requires the resettlement of 4,186 people and there are 
concerns that the project will exacerbate existing impacts, the project’s construction 
has been controversial (see e.g. International Rivers, 2012; THPC, 2012).ASEAS 5(2)
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Myanmar and the Yadana Gas Project
Whilst possessing abundant natural resources, Myanmar ranks poorly by almost eve-
ry development indicator (Ware, 2011). Myanmar’s laws and policies on environment 
are weakly developed and require the preparation of environmental impact assess-
ment or resettlement plans only since the recently passed Environment Conservation 
Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 9/20120) in March 2012. This law, however, is not yet 
effectively implemented, including and because of the absence of necessary by-laws. 
More broadly, policy on public participation and the release of information to the 
public still remains unclear (BEWG, 2011). Large foreign investments in Myanmar in 
the recent past, including hydropower dams and gas pipelines, supported the mili-
tary junta financially and politically and were linked to extensive corruption, wide-
spread environmental and social impacts, and numerous human rights violations 
(BEWG, 2011; Magee & Kelley, 2009; Simpson, 2007). Whilst political reform appears 
to be deepening since late 2010, it remains incomplete and Myanmar’s administrative 
and legal structures are fundamentally weak, the judiciary is not independent from 
the military, and the practices of existing energy projects leave a legacy in need of 
redress. 
Approximately 70 percent of Thailand’s electricity generation is fuelled by natural 
gas (Laksamakoses, 2006, cited in Greacen & Footner, 2006), and 30 percent of Thai-
land’s total natural gas consumption is sourced from Myanmar (Kate, 2011). Natural 
gas exports currently account for 12.5 percent of Myanmar’s GDP, although large vol-
umes of these revenues do not enter official government revenue streams (Earthrights 
International, n.d.; Turnell, 2010). Thailand presently is the main purchaser of natu-
ral gas from Myanmar, which it imports from the Andaman Sea crossing Mon state 
and Tenasserim Division in eastern Myanmar to Ratchaburi, Thailand via the Yadana 
and Yetagun pipelines, completed in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Both pipelines pass 
through ethnic Karen and Mon areas and have been linked to increased militarisa-
tion in project areas and intensified conflicts with ethnic groups, land confiscations, 
and human rights abuses (EarthRights International, 2010a, 2010b; Simpson, 2007). 
The Yadana project is operated by the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise in partnership 
with Total (France), Unocal (US), and PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP Thailand). 
In 2005, in a landmark case in the US courts, a major out-of-court settlement was ASEAS 5(2)
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agreed with Unocal, which was subsequently absorbed by Chevron and faced lawsuits 
for complicity in human rights abuses. Despite this, human rights abuses by pipeline 
security forces are reported to be on-going as of late 2009 (BEWG, 2011).
Transborder Environmental Justice and Power Planning Deficits 
In contrast to the procedure for the selection of domestic IPPs in Thailand, the proce-
dures for the selection of power import IPPs are less defined and more opaque (Grea-
cen & Greacen, 2012). Whereas for domestic projects IPPs must bid competitively 
for contracts, there is no competitive bidding process between alternative IPPs for 
power import projects. For many of these projects, therefore, selection is left to the 
discretion of EGAT. The key criterion for a power import project is that the electricity 
price is cheaper than power otherwise generated within Thailand. No environmental 
or social selection criteria are applied. Indeed, respecting the principle of sover  eignty, 
a key principle of the ‘ASEAN Way’, EGAT does not monitor IPPs’ compliance with 
neighbouring countries’ laws, which it considers the responsibility of the IPP and the 
host government. Furthermore, the ERC does not monitor the environmental and so-
cial performance of power import projects as it does not have the authority to issue a 
license in a neighbouring country (Thabchumpon & Middleton, in press). In Laos, on 
the other hand, the process of selecting and proposing projects disproportionately 
reflects the priorities of the private sector investors (Suhardiman et al., 2012).
The Thai state, as the purchaser of electricity via EGAT, arguably holds some de-
gree of responsibility for environmental and social impacts of IPP projects in Laos be-
cause without a power-buyer these projects could not operate. Furthermore, as EGAT 
is a shareholder in EGCO, Ratchaburi, and EGAT International, the Thai state itself is 
currently a minority shareholder in six IPP projects in Laos (Table 2). In other words, 
the Thai state’s commitment to political non-interference appears contradictory due 
to its role in approving power purchases and its shareholdings within many of the 
private sector consortiums, although these projects proceed with little transparency 
and accountability both to Thai civil society and Thailand’s ERC.
Overall, the mechanisms in Thailand for ensuring procedural environmental jus-
tice are notably weaker for power import projects, as exemplified by the current ASEAS 5(2)
309 308
Carl Middleton - Transborder Environmental Justice in Regional Energy Trade in Mainland South-East Asia
controversy surrounding the 1,260 megawatts Xayaburi dam proposed for the Me-
kong river’s mainstream in Northern Laos (Grumbine, Dore, & Xu, 2012; Matthews, 
2012). The lead developer of the predominantly Thai consortium is Ch. Karnchang, 
Thailand’s second largest construction company, the proposed financiers of the USD 
3.5 billion project are four Thai commercial banks, and 95 percent of the electricity 
generated would be exported to Thailand (see Tables 1 and 2). The project could have 
significant local and transborder impacts (International Centre for Environmental 
Management [ICEM], 2010). It has drawn criticism for proceeding with preliminary 
construction work and resettlement activities, including a ground breaking ceremo-
ny in October 2012, when not having completed a regional notification and consulta-
tion process with neighbouring riparian countries as committed to under the 1995 in-
tergovernmental Mekong Agreement (Herbertson, 2012; Latsaphao, 2012; Stone, 2011). 
In Thailand, the project was incorporated into the PDP with remarkable speed; whilst 
the Xayaburi dam was not even named in Revision 2 of the PDP issued in April 2011, in 
Revision 3 issued in June 2012, the project had been included and had already signed 
its Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) on 29 October 2011, legally committing EGAT to 
purchase power from the project. 
The Xayaburi dam has become an important test case for addressing transborder 
environmental justice through legal procedures within Thailand. In August 2012, ri-
parian communities from the north and northeast of Thailand submitted a case to 
Thailand’s Administrative Court suing EGAT, the Thai Cabinet, and three other state 
entities over their failure to follow the Thai Constitution before approving the PPA for 
the project. The raised concerns, deriving from the potential project impacts on Thai-
land, comprise the lack of a transborder EIA and an incomplete public consultation in 
Thailand (Thai People’s Network in Eight Mekong Provinces, 2012). Furthermore, the 
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) has initiated an investiga-
tion into the Xayaburi dam on the grounds that the project lacked information disclo-
sure and public participation and could impact marginalised communities in Thailand 
who are dependent on Mekong river resources (NHRCT, 2012a). This is a significant 
move given that the NHRCT has initiated investigations into only four transborder 
cases of Thai investment to date, which also include the Hongsa lignite power plant 
in Laos and the Hat Gyi hydropower dam in Myanmar (NHRCT, 2012b).ASEAS 5(2)
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Conclusion 
Thailand’s power demand, economic growth, and strengthening environment policies 
compared to neighbouring countries, together with the on-going process of regional 
economic integration, have been key drivers for the construction of energy projects 
in Laos and Myanmar. This regional energy trade has exported environmental and so-
cial impacts associated with energy production, in the past experienced by affected 
communities in Thailand, to communities in neighbouring countries. Many of these 
projects have a track record of undermining the natural resource base upon which 
rural populations in Laos and Myanmar depend for their livelihoods (Simpson, 2007). 
The expert-led PDP preparation process in Thailand by EGAT does not specifically 
account for and internalise the social and environmental impacts of individual power 
projects beyond specifying the electricity generation power mix. Instead, for domes-
tic projects, the enforcement of the relevant articles of Thailand’s Constitution, the 
body of environment and social laws, and the role of the ERC in licensing projects, 
alongside a reasonably independent judiciary, have all contributed towards improve-
ments in environmental governance over the past 15 years, although much remains 
to be done. The environmental and social impacts of power import projects from 
countries with weaker environmental governance are not safeguarded by Thailand’s 
power planning process. 
Within Laos and Myanmar, the rule of law is weak, the judicial system is relatively 
underdeveloped and lacks independence, and space for public discussion and protest 
is constrained. Therefore, communities affected by energy projects have little access 
to justice through formal judicial procedures. In Laos, shallow public participation 
processes mask deeper political inequalities in decision making, whilst in Myanmar 
the notion of public participation is largely absent to date. Furthermore, with many 
important decisions taken in Thailand, which is the electricity buyer and also the 
home country of a number of the energy and construction companies and financiers, 
the possibility of participation in decision-making of locally affected people in Laos 
and Myanmar becomes even more distanced. 
Historically, electricity consumption has created environmental injustice between 
those who benefit most from electricity generation – including the construction and 
energy companies who build and operate the projects and energy intensive indus-ASEAS 5(2)
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tries in Thailand – and those who pay the costs through the deterioration of their 
livelihoods and health. Often, project proponents legitimise large regional energy 
trade projects through discourses that frame them as bringing economic coopera-
tion, cheap energy, and energy security. Yet the social, environmental, and economic 
costs of these projects are comparatively localised. Discourses that legitimise and 
mask environmental injustice, therefore, reframe and reimagine the use of resources 
through a politics of scale away from local community use and towards exploitation 
by energy project developers in line with the development plans of national govern-
ments (Lebel, Garden, & Imamura, 2005; Sneddon, 2003). 
In Dumping in Dixie, Bullard (1990, p. 32) reveals how environmentally harmful pro-
jects in the US were sold to poorer communities as bringing jobs and redressing past 
social injustices. Analogously, it is the communities at the comparative margins of 
mainland South-East Asia’s increasingly liberalised market economy who experience 
firsthand the negative social and environmental costs of the large energy projects 
that are now spreading from Thailand into Myanmar and Laos, and to whom these 
projects are framed to bring development, modernisation, and poverty alleviation. 
For such projects, however, to be equitable and sustainable, it requires a significantly 
deeper commitment on the part of governments and project developers to strong and 
enforced environmental legislation, legally binding commitments to affected com-
munities, and the ability for communities to access information, participation, and 
justice – including across borders. Otherwise, just as economic, social, and political 
injustices have created deep cleavages within Thai society, it is conceivable that simi-
lar tensions could emerge in neighbouring Laos and Myanmar, and across borders.
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